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I think in our society that is growing in complexity there are
bound to be innumerable people in common disasters, calamities,
or ventures who would go begging for justice without the class ac-
tion but who could with all regard to due process be protected.
Some of these are consumers whose claims may seem de minimis
but who alone have no practical recourse for either remuneration
or injunctive relief. Some may be environmentalists who have no
photographic development plant about to be ruined because of air
pollution by radiation but who suffer perceptibly by smoke, nox-
ious gases, or radiation. Or the unnamed individual may be only
a ratepayer being excessively charged by a utility or a homeowner
whose assessment is slowly rising beyond his ability to pay.'
These are the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, partly dissenting and
partly concurring in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the recent Su-
preme Court opinion which immediately experienced lively discus-
sion in the popular press.2
Especially since amendment of Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in 1966, the class action device has become a significant
device of sociologically important litigation in the federal system.
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
** Research Assistant, J.D. 1975, Case Western Reserve University Law
School.
1. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2156 (1974).
2. For an example of the popular press comments following the Su-
preme Court opinion, see Nnwswrn, June 10, 1974, at 48 (vol. 83 no. 23).
December 1974 Vol. 12 No. I
That device has been described by Professor Hazard as a product
of a changing social environment, "an attempt to provide something
in the nature of a mass production remedy."3  While pursu-
ant to Professor Hazard's description the rules of common law
sprang up hundreds of years ago as a legal response to individual
transactions, administrative regulations are a present day response
to the "mass production" of legal problems in the modern world
and the class action device should be viewed "in relation to sub-
stantive legal problems of the 20th Century."4 Similarly, Professor
Miller suggests that
... some of the procedural patterns that are considered funda-
mental when the litigation involves a single plaintiff and a single
defendant will have to be abandoned or modified in certain actions
under Rule 23 (b) (3).5
Of course, definitely opposite viewpoints have also been expressed.
Thus, the fear has been expressed that the district courts may be
"flooded" with class litigations, with the result that there may be
an impairment, rather than an improvement, of judicial efficiency;
also, the effect of excessive class action suits requiring the defend-
ants to pay large costs of notice, and thereby imposing on them the
practical necessity of entering into expensive settlements, was de-
scribed as "legalized blackmail".7
In addition to very many law review articles, entire symposia8
have been devoted to the subject of class actions and a special pub-
lication is now being issued which is restricted to class actions.9
Our present study will be limited to dealing with one of the signifi-
cant changes effectuated by the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, that
is, the changed procedure for what was the "spurious" class action.
3. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive
Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 308 (1972).
4. Id. at 310.
5. Miller, Problems of Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions
under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 507 (1971); see also Miller,
Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 323-24 (1973)
(suggesting that certain adjustments should be made in order to reap the
benefits of the class action procedure).
6. See, e.g., Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruc-
tion?, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
7. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1, 9 (1971), quoted with approval in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479
F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen III, the decision affirmed by Eisen
IV which is here discussed); see also Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Anti-
trust Review, 72 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 34-42 (1972).
8. See, e.g., The Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
REv. 496 (1969) and CLASS ACTIONS PanUM (Fuchsberg ed. 1973).
9. The so-called CLASS ACTON REPORTR, published since 1972.
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One of the reasons for changing from the previous procedure in
handling spurious classes was to make more effective use of the
so-called spurious class action. Formerly, a member of the "spuri-
ous" class could recover only if he took an affirmative step to par-
ticipate in the action, so that the "spurious" class action in effect
was merely a device of joinder of parties. Now, the member of a
"spurious" class may obtain recovery, or conversely may be ac-
tively ruled to have no recovery, unless he affirmatively opts out
of the litigation under Rule 23 (c) (2). Certain other Supreme Court
decisions,' 0 which will be mentioned, have had a limiting effect,
but the recent Eisen IV decision deserves special consideration.
We shall examine in this article the effects and implications of re-
cent court cases, the most significant being the Eisen case, on this
"new" spurious class action. We shall then suggest and discuss
possible modifications of Rule 23, as well as other solutions, so as
to make the newly created type of "spurious" class action more
feasible while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls and dangers
of excessive class litigation.
HISTORY OF LITIGATION IN THE Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin CASE
In 1966 Morton Eisen commenced an action, on behalf of himself
and all odd-lot purchasers and sellers on the New York Stock Ex-
change, against two major odd-lot dealers, Carlisle & Jacquelin
and Decoppet & Doremus.11 The suit was grounded on the allega-
tion that the two firms had conspired to monopolize odd-lot trad-
ing and had allegedly combined to set an excessive odd-lot differen-
tial12 and thereby had violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1
and 2.
The defendants made a motion to dismiss the action on the
ground that it was not maintainable as a class action. Judge Tyler
granted the motion to dismiss the class action on the ground that
10. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1966); Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
11. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The two
firms between 1962 and 1966 controlled 99% of all odd-lot trading. Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jackquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2144 (1974).
12. An odd-lot is any number of shares less than the "round lot" of 100
shares. An extra charge besides the normal commission is charged for deal-
ing in odd-lots and that extra charge is the "odd-lot differential."
Eisen could not" . . . fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class,"' 3 a requirement for the maintenance of a class action
under Rule 23,14 as the size and diversity of interests of the mem-
bers of the class as well as Eisen's comparatively small stake "
would preclude adequate representation. Judge Tyler stated that
... it is impossible to assume that he alone with a comparatively
miniscule and limited interest in odd-lot transactions can represent
that large a class, many of whose members necessarily have larger
and different interests.'0
Secondly, Judge Tyler held that notice to the class's members must
meet the standards of Rule 23(c) (2) 1 as well as due process, citing
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust,'8 and that the notice pro-
posed by Eisen, that of press advertisements plus notice to the
stock exchange firms, would not be sufficient. Thirdly, Judge Tyler
held that Eisen did not meet the requirements of Rule 23(b) (3)1 9
as questions common to the members of the class had not been
shown to predominate.
The court of appeals, in an opinion commonly referred to as Ei-
sen 1,20 held that the decision dismissing the class action was fi-
13. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Ei-
sen's individual cause of action was not dismissed.
14. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if ". . . (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4).
15. The amount of Eisen's individual claim was later determined to be
only $70. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2144 (1974).
16. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
17. (2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the
judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through
his counsel. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2).
18. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
19. (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members, and that a class action is supe-
rior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23 (b) (3).
20. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1035"(1967).
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nal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, emphasizing the practical aspects that
such a dismissal would have on Eisen's suit. "The alternatives
are to appeal now or to end the lawsuit for all practical purposes
... we can safely assume that no lawyer of competence is going
to undertake this complex and costly case to recover $70 for Mr.
Eisen", and "[w]here the effect of a district court's order, if not
reviewed, is the death knell of the action, review should be al-
lowed."21
Then, in what is known as Eisen 11,22 the court of appeals re-
versed the dismissal of the action. With respect to the issue of
"adequate representation" the court noted that the suit was not a
collusive suit, nor had the leader and the class antagonistic inter-
ests. The court of appeals rejected the district court's reliance on
quantitative elements, such as size of the leader's claim com-
pared to size of the class, and noted that
the new rule should be given a liberal rather than restrictive
interpretation... [and that] the dismissal in limine of a particular
proceeding as not a proper class action is justified only by a clear
showing to that effect and after a proper appraisal of all the fac-
tors enumerated on the face of the rule itself.23
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals found that the
class action was maintainable under Rule 23 (b) (3) in that 1) the
class and its leader had a "common nucleus of operative facts"
'24
and that the only major differences were in ". . . the computation
of damages, a factor which, by itself, does not justify dismissal of
the class action";25 and 2) noting the earlier finding that dismis-
sal of the class action would be fatal to any individual suit, the
court found the class action to be a "superior" method to adjudi-
cate the interests involved. The court did have questions pertain-
taining to Rule 23(b) (3) (D) on the manageability of the class ac-
tion. As to the requirements of notice under Rule 23(c) (2), the
court found the record to be inadequate to enable it to determine
the ease of obtaining addresses of members of the class, and it
21. Id. at 120-21.
22. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
23. Id. at 563. See 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 198 (1969).
24. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 566 (2d Cir. 1968).
25. Id., citing Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). For a discussion of the notice requirements laid down in
Eisen II, see 43 TuL. L. REv. 369 (1969).
therefore remanded the question for an evidentiary hearing in the
district court.
26
In his dissent, Chief Judge Lumbard referred to the impossibility
of plaintiff giving suitable notice and to the unmanageability of
the suit as a class action. He stated:
What could be less of a class action than a suit where there are
more than 3,750,000 potential plaintiffs living in every state of the
union and in almost every foreign country?. . . Obviously the only
persons to gain from a class suit are not potential plaintiffs, but
the attorneys who will represent them .... Even if all the diffi-
culties inherent in the administration of the suit were overcome,
the amount expended in filing and processing claims would prob-
ably exceed any recovery .... The appropriate action for this
court is to affirm the district court and put an end to this Franken-
stein monster posing as a class action. 27
Next, Judge Tyler in 1971, in light of relevant facts found, con-
cluded that the case was a proper one for class action litigation in
that the three issues presented on remand, i.e. the adequacy of rep-
resentation, manageability, and notice, could be handled properly
within the framework of Rule 23.28 There was a somewhat ex-
tensive discussion of manageability. While not finding a problem in
estimating total damages, the court found significant difficulty in
the distribution of the recovery to the members of the class, en-
gendered by the prohibitively high cost of computing and award-
ing multitudinous small claims to each member of the class. 20  The
court tentatively accepted the suggestion of plaintiff that after sat-
isfying the individual claims filed the remainder of the recovery be
set up in a fund which would be used to reduce the odd-lot differ-
ential in an amount to be determined by the court, until the fund
is depleted. The benefits of this "fluid recovery"30 would. . . flow
in the main to those who bore the burden of defendants' allegedly
illegal acts."31
The final issue dealt with was the type of notice required, and
the question of who should pay for its cost. As to what was re-
quired by the Constitution, Judge Tyler viewed the test of the pro-
priety of notice as being ".... a flexible one [which] must be ap-
26. For general discussions of Eisen II, see 21 VAND. L. lbv. 1124 (1968);
18 Am. U. L. REv. 225 (1968).
27. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570-72 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
29. The court found the cost of notice once damages had been assessed
and of the processing of claims to be about $500,000. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. The propriety of a fluid recovery is not reached by the Eisen Supreme
Court opinion.
31. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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plied on a case-by-case basis."32 In determining what is the "best
notice practicable," Judge Tyler observed that
... where a class consists of a large number of claimants with rela-
tively small individual claims, notice to individual class members,
as a legal and practical matter, becomes less important and need
not be unduly emphasized or required.33
Further, the notice requirements must be shaped so as not to
amount to an "insuperable tariff on prosecution of the case."
'34
Judge Tyler ruled that individual notice be given to the 2,000 class
members who had 10 or more transactions during the relevant pe-
riod and to 5,000 class members selected at random from among the
more than 2,000,000 class members readily -identifiable; individual
notice should be given to all members of the New York Stock Ex-
change; and there should be publication in the prominent papers
in New York and California, such as the Wall Street Journal. The
total cost of notice required under that plan was approximately
$21,720. Noting that ". . . if I were to follow literally the earlier in-
dication of the court of appeals that the plaintiff must always
pay for the expenses of notice in the first instance ... this litiga-
tion would come to an abrupt termination,"3 5 Judge Tyler held that
a preliminary hearing on the merts would be held to determine if
the plaintiff was "more than likely to prevail at trial".
In his next opinion 5 Judge Tyler ruled, after holding a mini-hear-
ing37 on the merits, that Eisen was "more than likely" to prevail at
trial, and he therefore ordered defendant to pay 90% of the notice
costs. 8
The next opinion in the Eisen case was handed down by the court
of appeals in 1973, and is referred to as Eisen IIL39 The court of
appeals reversed the district court, finding that a class action was
not maintainable. The court based its opinion on three grouhds.
The first was that individual notice must be given to those mem-
32. Id. at 266.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 267.
35. Id. at 269.
36. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
37. Although the hearing allowed for oral testimony, none was taken;
briefs, documents and affidavits were submitted in lieu thereof and oral ar-
guments were had. A minimum of discovery was allowed.
38. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
39. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
bers of the class who could be readily identified,40 which the court
found to be an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23 (c) (2). Sec-
ondly, the court rejected the idea of a mini-hearing, as well as the
apportionment of costs. The court held that such a hearing, which
would make tentative findings without full safeguards, would be
irreparably prejudicial, and that such a procedure was not author-
ized under Rule 23. The court would therefore require the plaintiff
to pay the full cost of notice.41 Finally, the court found the case
to be unmanageable under Rule 23(b) (3) (D). Two reasons were
given. First was the tremendous cost of notice which Eisen had
refused to pay. Second was the difficulty of distributing the re-
covery. The court rejected the idea of a "fluid recovery" as uncon-
stitutional in this case, as well as being outside of Rule 23.42
Snyder v. Harris and Zahn v. International
Paper Company
Before discussing in detail the recent Supreme Court opinion in
the Eisen case (Eisen IV), brief mention will be made of two other
Supreme Court decisions, the Snyder case and the Zahn case.
Snyder v. Harris43 was decided in 1969, three years after Rule 23
had undergone major revisions. The case, presenting two separate
actions consolidated in the Supreme Court, dealt with the question
of whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the plaintiffs had met the
$10,000 sum in controversy requirement. One plaintiff, Snyder,
was suing on behalf of herself in the sum of $8,740 and approxi-
mately 4,000 similarly situated shareholders whose aggregated
claims were approximately $1,200,000. In the other action the plain-
tiff Coburn was suing for himself, alleging damages of $7.81, and
for approximately 18,000 similarly situated Gas Service Company
customers, whose aggregated claim was over $10,000. 44 The claims
of the two classes were found to be separate and distinct, and the
classes would have been categorized as a spurious class under old
40. Id. at 1015.
41. See 73 COLUm. L. REv. 1640, 1657 (1973), where it is suggested that
the Eisen III court had rejected the method of a preliminary hearing to de-
determine who should pay the costs of notice, but had not clearly rejected
the idea that the defendant be required to pay part of the cost depending
on the probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits. But see
Eisen v. Carlisle, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 (1974).
42. See discussion of "fluid recovery", text accompanying notes 103 et
seq., infra.
-43. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
44. The court of appeals in Gas Service Company v. Coburn, 389 F.2d
831 (10th Cir. 1968), allowed aggregation of the claim while the appellate
court in-Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), did not.
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Rule 23. Justice Black, writing for seven members of the Court,
concluded that aggregation of separate and distinct claims could
not be allowed under the court's interpretation of the statutory
phrase "matters in controversy" and that the amendment of Rule
23 could not be read to cause a change in the jurisdictional require-
ments, as such a reading would conflict with Rule 82.
4 5
The question not answered in Snyder was whether, if the claims
of the class were separate and distinct and the class's represen-
tative met the jurisdictional amount, the members of the class
would also each be required to have $10,000 in controversy. This
was the fact situation and the issue dealt with in Zahn v. Inter-
tional Paper Co.,4 6 an environmental case, brought in diversity.
Justice White, speaking for six members of the Court, held that the
jurisdictional amount requirement was to be applied to each mem-
ber of the class, as long as their claims were separate and distinct.
47
The opinion is based on a review of prior decisions, which Justice
White held interpreted the meaning of the "matter in controversy"
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as requiring that each separate and dis-
tinct claim meet the jurisdictioral amount.
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent,48 suggested that the class
claim be considered ancillary to that of its representatives, and that
therefore if the jurisdictional requirement is met by the class rep-
resentative, the class members need not show independent grounds
for jurisdiction. Justice Brennan argued that the same practical
reasons which allow ancillary jurisdiction in the case of compul-
sory counterclaims under Rule 13(a) or intervention as of right
under Rule 24(a) ,49 should be followed in regard to class actions.
Justice Brennan backed up his argument for the use of ancillary
jurisdiction by citing Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble5" where
45. These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the juris-
diction of the United States district courts or venue of actions
therein. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
46. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
47. Though this opinion dealt only with the jurisdictional amount, it may
suggest that diversity must also be complete throughout the class. But see
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) which is distin-
guishable on the ground that it was a "true" class action.
48. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 302-12 (1973).
49. Id. at 306.
50. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
the requirement of diversity was dispensed with, except as to the
original plaintiff and defendant.
As is pointed out by Justice Brennan, "class actions were born of
necessity"5' 1 and provided a device for recovery of damages that
might otherwise be remediless. It may be suggested that the Zahn
opinion unnecessarily restricts this important device, by ignoring
the concept of ancillary jurisdiction which is used in construing
compulsory counter-claims under Rule 13(a) ;G2 perhaps a similar
position should have been taken with respect to the $10,000 re-
quirement also for claims otherwise meeting the class action re-
quirements of Rule 23.
Eisen IV
Following the brief description of the history of the Eisen case
and of related matters, we now come to the culmination of the Ei-
sen litigation by Eisen IV, which was decided by the Supreme
Court on May 28, 1974.53 Certain decisions of the Supreme Court
since the 1966 amendment, previously discussed, served to limit
the extent of Rule 23(b) (3) class actions. The Snyder" case and
the later Zahn55 case had the broad effect of limiting the use of
class actions in the federal system; first, by requiring that in a
proper case the leader of a class must himself meet the $10,000 re-
quirement (no aggregation being permitted of the amounts
claimed by the individual members of a class) and then, by demand-
ing that to be a member of a class each individual must meet the
statutory requirement of $10,000. Important as these specifications
are, they might be remedied by congressional legislation. The Ei-
sen IV limitation of class action conceivably, however, may be of
greater significance in that it might be a constitutional due process
limitation which would make it potentially impossible, without a
constitutional amendment, to enact corrective legislation concern-
ing the notice required by Eisen IV. Careful analysis of the various
holdings of Eisen IV is therefore suggested.
First, the Supreme Court held that the broad interpretation given
to the finality principle by Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.r ap-
51. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. at 306 n.9, citing 3B J.
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE q 23.02[1], 23.05 passim (2d ed. 1969).
52. See Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961), aff'g
275 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1960).
53. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
54. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
55. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
56. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In that case the immediate appealability of a
federal court's preliminary determination as to whether plaintiff in a stock-
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plies to the district court determination involved in Eisen, namely
the imposition upon the defendant of an extensive obligation to de-
fray the expenses of the required notice to the individual members
of the class. That affirmance of appealability settles an important
question of the reviewability of class action determinations. The
question arises, however, whether this affirmance of immediate ap-
pealability foreshadows immediate appealability of some other dis-
trict court determinations in the handling of class actions. For in-
stance, will the Supreme Court sanction the immediate appealabil-
ity of a dismissal by the district court of a class action which per-
mits the action to continue as an individual action, as was ruled
in Eisen I?r5 While not as clearly analogous to the Cohen situation
as Eisen IV, the answer should be in the affirmative.51 Will the
Supreme Court sanction immediate appealability of a district court
determination reducing the size of a class? Also, should there be
an immediate appealability of a district court determination which
advises a member of a class under Rule 23 (c) (2) that his request
for an exclusion will not be honored?59 Again, the answer should
properly be in the affirmative. Rejection of a request to be let out
from a lawsuit should 'be immediately appealable by the person
wanting to be let out, in the same way as the denial of a claimed
right to intervene is immediately appealable by the person seeking
to intervene.60
Next, the significant issue decided by Eisen IV was that in a Rule
23(b) (3) class action the requirement of "individual notice to all
holder's derivative action must comply with a state statute requiring the
posting of a substantial bond in stockholder's suits at the beginning of the
litigation, was affirmed. Appealability was affirmed on the ground that
that determination was ". . . a final disposition of a claimed right which
is not an ingredient of the cause of action" on which the suit as such was
based. Id. at 546-47.
57. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (Eisen I) (affirming appealability on the ground that
such determination was a "death knell" to the entire action); see also
Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 58 F.R.D. 178 (N.D. Ill.
1972), petition Jor cert. denied, after court of appeals decision, 42 U.S.L.W.
3666 (1973).
58. See also Gillespie v. U.S. Steel, 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
59. Such a problem might arise when considering whether the request
for exclusion was properly made within the specified time.
60. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 524-
25 (1947); Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502
(1941).
members who can be identified through reasonable effort" must
be strictly construed. The Supreme Court seems to have held that
this provision means that individual notice must directly be sent
to all class members "whose names and addresses may be ascer-
tained through reasonable effort."61 The question arises whether
any less direct notification of the individual members of the class,
though apparently not permitted by Rule 23(c) (2), would still be
constitutional. Generally, the basic importance of the 1966 amend-
ment of Rule 23 was its intention to broaden the scope of what
were formerly called "spurious" class actions (former Rule 23(a)
(3)). Formerly, it required members of a "spurious" class to appear
in the action, usually within the limitation of a "bar" date, in or-
der to participate.6 2 Now, since 1966, there can be representation
of, and recovery by, the members of a "spurious" class as long as
they do not opt out of the class (new Rule 23 (c) (2) and (c) (3)).
In other words, the procedure has changed: formerly, it required
affirmative action of the class members to participate; now it re-
quires affirmative action of the members to be left out of a class.
This change in policy results from the commendable legislative
intent to broaden the use of class actions. The immediate problem
is: despite Eisen IV, can the notice requirement of Rule 23 (c) (2) be
constitutionally lessened, perhaps by permitting indirect or less
than complete notice, or can the notice requirement even be con-
stitutionally dispensed with entirely, as long as there is a showing
of adequate representation?
3
Regardless of the answer to this problem, the immediate question
is whether Eisen IV establishes a constitutional barrier. In Eisen
IV the Court mentioned the comments of the Advisory Committee
accompanying the 1966 amendment and the Committee's reference
to the constitutional requirement of due process. The Court dis-
cussed Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.0 4 and the prob-
lems of service by publication, and stated that:
[T] he express language and intent of Rule 23(c) (2) leave no doubt
61. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2150 (1974).
62. As the late Judge Frank described it, ".... a proceeding under 23 (a)
(3) is, in effect, but a congeries of separate suits so that each claimant must,
as to his own claim, meet the jurisdictional requirements." Steele v. Guar-
anty Trust Co. of New York 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d Cir. 1947).
63. These problems determine the extent to which amendments of the
language of Rule 23(c) (2) should be suggested; see text accompanying
notes 162 et seq., infra.
64. 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see also the reference in the Advisory Committee
Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966), to Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940),
which created constitutional limitations for in personam class actions, pri-
marily the requirement of adequate representation. The Mulane case was
an in rem or a quasi in rem action.
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that individual notice must be provided to those class members who
are identifiable through reasonable effort. In the present case, the
names and addresses of 2,250,000 class members are easily ascer-
tainable, and there is nothing to show that individual notice cannot
be mailed to each.
This portion of the Court's opinion was concluded by stating that
... quite apart from what due process may require, the command
of Rule 23 is clearly to the contrary [of Eisen's position].65
This substantially recites the steps by which the Supreme Court
reached its result, and the fundamental problem emerges: Is the
specified requirement of notice a constitutional requirement of due
process or is it merely a consequence and interpretation of Rule
23 (c) (2) ?
Constitutional due process is not mentioned in the Eisen IV opin-
ion, but clearly the cases of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.60 and of Schroeder v. City of New York, 67 both men-
tioned in Eisen IV, were cases of a different character than Eisen.
Mullane was an in rem or a quasi in rem action, while Eisen in-
volves an in personam class action. Both Mullane and Schroeder
reached a particular result on the basis of constitutional law, but
Eisen IV suggests that the result reached in Eisen was only an in-
terpretation of Rule 23(c) (2). Mullane and Schroeder seem to be
mentioned in Eisen only in connection with the description of the
legislative history of Rule 23,68 and were not discussed for the pur-
pose of showing their specific applicability to the present situation.
The above-discussed holding of Eisen IV was based on the "express
language and intent of Rule 23 (c) (2)", and reference was made to
"the command of Rule 23", "apart from what due process may re-
quire."0' 9 Of course, the counterargument may be made that Rule
23 was selected by the Court as a more obvious basis, and the con-
stitutional basis was considered an implied foundation. But,
65. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2151-152 (1974) (empha-
sis added).
66. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
67. 371U.S. 208 (1962).
68. For a discussion of the proposition that Mullane and Schroeder may
in fact not be apposite to the Eisen situation, see text accompanying notes
70-78, infra; see also McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Con-
cepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance-Class Action Issues, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1351, 1389-96 (1974).
69. 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2151-52 (1974).
clearly the constitutional requirement of due process did not
serve as a foundation. Serious consequences will follow from such a
recognition when we consider the possibility of drafting amend-
ments remedying the result achieved by Eisen IV.
The next question is whether, aside from the manner in which
they were utilized in the Eisen IV opinion, the cases of Mulane7o
and Schroeder71 independently support the Eisen result, as they
were believed to support the result in Eisen 111, 72 (the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit decision which was affirmed by Eisen
IV). Eisen III extensively discusses Mullane and fully sets forth the
constitutional difficulties inherent in service by publication, elabo-
rating upon the statement that a "mere gesture is not due process"
and that published notice alone is not adequate. 7 But the Eisen IV
opinion fails to mention the Mullane facts, which were very differ-
ent from the Eisen facts, and fails to state that the Mulane facts
were found to be determinative in the Mullane opinion. Thus, the
Mulane opinion generally stated:
A construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impos-
sible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified.
74
Under the due process clause, the case ruled invalid a New York
statute which permitted trust companies to give notice by publica-
tion of their petition for judicial settlement of the companies' small
trust estate accounts. These accounts were pooled into one com-
mon trust fund for investment purposes, in a situation in which the
individual trustees periodically transmitted to the individual bene-
ficiaries the income due to them. Emphasizing that due regard
must be paid to the "practicalities and peculiarities of the case",75
the Court recognized "the practical difficulties and costs that would
be attendant on frequent investigations into the status of great num-
bers of beneficiaries, many of whose interests in the common fund
are so remote as to be ephemeral," and concluded that such "im-
practicable and extended searches are not required in the name of
due process." 76 In particular, the Mulane Court stressed with re-
spect to the position of the individual income beneficiaries:
The trustee periodically remits their income to them, and we think
that they might reasonably expect that with or apart from their
70. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
71. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
72. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
73. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2151 (1974).
74. 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
75. Id. at 314.
76. Id. at 317-18. In view of the possible small individual interests of the
members of a Rule 23 (b) (3) class action, this latter quotation particularly
[VOL. 12: 1, 1974] Federal Rule 23
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
remittances word might come to them personally that steps were
being taken affecting their interests. 7
Accordingly, the Mullane holding, as such, does not seem to lend
support to a ruling that the Eisen device of notice, adopted by
the district court,78 was unconstitutional. Nor can the Eisen indi-
vidual notice requirement independently be derived from the doc-
trine of Hansberry v. Lee.79 In that case, enforcement of restrictive
covenants allegedly binding on areas of the City of Chicago was at
issue. It was decided that absent persons involved with respect to
city blocks, other than those affecting the parties in the litigation,
could not constitutionally be bound by a class action. The Court
frowned upon a solution whereby
all those who are free alternatively either to assert rights
or to challenge them are of a single class, so that any group, merely
because it is of the class so constituted, may be deemed adequately
to represent any others of the class in litigating their interests in
either alternative. Such a selection of representatives for purposes
of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even
probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent,
does not afford that protection to absent parties which due process
requires. The doctrine of representation of absent parties in a class
suit has not hitherto been thought to go so far.80
Thus, the issue in Hansberry v. Lee really becomes one not of indi-
vidual notice requirement, but of "adequate representation." And
in the Eisen situation, as well as in the normal consumer class ac-
tions, there seems to be no problem of "adequate representation."
Similarly, the individual notice requirement cannot be derived as
a constitutional obligation from the case of Schroeder v. City of New
York,81 also cited and quoted in Eisen IV.s2 The facts of the
serves to evidence the inapplicability of Mullane and its holding of uncon-
stitutionality to the present situation. See also the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., in which he ad-
hered to the majority's view holding deprivation of the use of garnished
wages a violation of due process, as follows: "Since this deprivation cannot
be characterized as de minimis, she [the wage earner] must be accorded
the usual requisites of procedural due process: notice and a prior hearing."
395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (concurring opinion).
77. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318
(1950).
78. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
79. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
80. Id. at 45.
81. 371U.S. 208 (1962).
82. 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2151 (1974).
Schroeder case are so different from the Eisen facts that Schroeder
can be easily distinguished. Schroeder involved the question of
whether notice was adequate in a condemnation proceeding affect-
ing property owned by one individual which consisted of a house
and three acres of land. The condemnation proceeding was neces-
sitated by the city's planned diversion of a portion of a river some
25 miles upstream from the individual's property. The only notices
given were publications in certain newspapers (not even the newspa-
pers in the larger towns nearby), and of notices on trees and poles
in the general vicinity of, but not on, the individual's property. Al-
though the individual's name and address were readily ascertain-
able from both deed records and tax rolls, neither the newspaper
publications nor the notices on the trees and poles contained the
name of the individual. It was on these facts that the Supreme
Court concluded as follows:
We hold that the newspaper publications and posted notices in
the circumstances of this case did not measure up to the quality
of notice which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires.83
These facts demonstrate that the due process ruling of Schroeder
cannot constitute a precedent for a due process argument in Eisen
IV. Nor should any comfort therefor be derived from the fact that
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing the unanimous opinion in Schroeder,
used the following language:
The general rule that emerges from the Mullane Case is that no-
tice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose
name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and
whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the pro-
ceedings in question.84
In quoting from this language of Schroeder, Mr. Justice Powell's
opinion singles out the words "general rule", thereby creating the
impression that the general statement constituted Mr. Justice Stew-
art's holding. That this was not so is apparent from the above-
quoted paragraph of Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion in which he
specifically stated that his holding was restricted to the particular
facts of the present case.88
The next portion of the Eisen IV opinion dealt with the fact
83. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962) (emphasis
added).
84. Id. at 212-13.
85. In addition, Mr. Justice Powell's statement in Eisen IV that Schroeder
was decided "prior to the promulgation of amended Rule 23", 94 S. Ct. at
2151, though of course accurate, is not very meaningful if it seeks to convey
the impression that the rulemakers were incorporating such a "general rule"
into amended Rule 23. Not only did the so-called "general rule" fail to
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(which the district court opinion by Judge Tyler had discussed 6 )
that 90% of the notice cost were placed on defendants, after a pre-
liminary hearing by the District Court concluding that it was "more
than likely" that plaintiff would prevail.8 7 That holding of Eisen
IV was clearly predicated on an interpretation of Rule 23, the Court
stating that such procedure "contravenes the Rule." No constitu-
tional arguments are relied upon directly, though it should be
noted that Mr. Justice specifically stated:
Additionally, we might note that a preliminary determination of
the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant, since
of necessity it is not accompanied by the traditional rules and pro-
cedures applicable to civil trials.8 8
But after that broad statement the opinion concluded as follows:
In the absence of any support under Rule 23, petitioner's effort
to impose the cost of notice on respondents must fail.
8 9
It would seem that that portion of Mr. Justice Powell's opinion does
not assume constitutional impact. As shown by the context, his
reference to "traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil
trials" apparently was not intended to carry overtones of constitu-
tional dimensions of due process; at least, if it should have such
overtones, the statement was intended to be nothing more than an
obiter dictum. Accordingly, the result seems to be clear that in
Mr. Justice Powell's view, a proper amendment of Rule 23 could be
sufficient to provide a basis for 'a court determination imposing the
costs of notice on a defendant in an appropriate case. Later on, we
shall attempt to draft amendatory language for Rule 23 to accom-
plish such a result.
Certain issues were intentionally left undecided in Eisen IV.
While the court of appeals decision of Eisen III headed an entire
portion of its opinion as dealing with manageability, 90 and con-
cluded that the proposed class action was unmanageable under
establish a rule of law, but the Schroeder case was not even mentioned in
the Advisory Committee Notes to amend Rule 23. See 39 F.R.D. 69, 98
(1966).
86. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
87. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152-53 (1974).
88. Id. at 2153 (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1016-18 (2d Cir. 1973).
Rule 23 (b) (3) (D),91 Eisen IV did not specifically determine the
question of "manageability." Obviously, no such specific determi-
nation seemed to be necessary in view of the result reached by Ei-
sen IV that the requirement of specific notice to each individual
member of the class, at the expense of the plaintiff, was not com-
plied with. 92 However, it is fair to assume that Eisen IV would
share the finding of "unnianageability." In fact, "unmanageabil-
-ity" would seem to have been the most appropriate reason for dis-
missing the Eisen case as a class action,93 or at least for reducing
the Eisen class to a more manageable subclassY4 In this way, a class
action involving 2,250,000 members who could be identified with
reasonable effort would not have burdened the courts, and there
would have been no occasion for the Supreme Court to issue an
opinion like Eisen IV, which raised questions as to the kind of no-
tice requirement and as to the propriety of a minihearing in Rule
23 (b) (3) class actions. Perhaps a case of a more limited class would
have reached results favoring class actions more broadly.
Finally, Eisen IV 'brushed aside the issue of "adequate represen-
tation." It had 'been urged that adequate representation, rather
than notice, is the real touchstone of due process in a class action and
therefore satisfies Rule 23. The Court refuted this argument by
noting that Rule 23 speaks of notice as well as adequate representa-
tion,95 and furthermore that such contention would read the re-
quirement out of the Rule because it would probably lead to the
conclusion that in the present case no notice at all would be re-
quired.9 6 Of course, objections may be raised to this line of rea-
soning, principally on the ground that in view of the language of
Rule 23 (c) (2) of "best notice practicable under the circumstances,"
the notice device advanced by Judge Tyler would simply involve an
adjustment of Rule 23(c) (2) to the practicalities of the situation,
91. Id. at 1018 (the portion was headed "VI As a Class Action the Case
is Unmanageable").
92. In its pertinent part, Rule 23 (b) (3) authorizes the district court to
order maintenance of the action as a class action if the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
and that a class action is superior to other available methods. In this re-
gard, the following was specifically listed as a matter pertinent to the find-
ings of the court: "(D) the difficulties to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action."
93. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2150-52 (1974).
94. See the dissent of Judge Lumbard in Eisen 1, 391 F.2d 555, 570, 572
(2d Cir. 1968).
95. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas in Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2153
(1974); see also the opinion of the District Court for the Northern District
of California in In re Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 101 (N.D. Cal.
1973), which distinguished Eisen III on the basis of the size of the class.
96. In listing the general prerequisites of class actions, Rule 23 (a) (4)
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and not to its abolition. 7 Whatever the merit of such an argu-
ment, it would seem that Eisen IV suggests that any amendatory
language of the Federal Rule should be directed to subsection (c) (2).
A few words may be appropriate for describing Mr. Justice Doug-
las' partial dissent, concurred in by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr.
Justice Marshall. Mr. Justice Douglas commenced his dissent 'by
stating:
While I am in general agreement with the phases of this case
touched on by the Court, I add a few words because its opinion
does not fully explore the issues which will be dispositive of this
case on remand to the District Court.
98
These words of Mr. Justice Douglas show that his dissent is rather
limited. Specifically, he seems to disagree with the kind of remand
-which should be ordered, although he is apparently in general
agreement as to the requirement of notice in class actions under
Rule 23 (b) (3).
His dissent seems to be clear as to how he would handle the ac-
tual remand in the Eisen litigation. The majority remanded the
cause "with instructions to dismiss the class action as so de-
fined,"0' 9 noting specifically that that dismissal is "without preju-
dice to any efforts petitioner may make to redefine his class either
under Rule 23 (c) (4) or Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15."100 In other words,
there will be a dismissal but the plaintiff may take defined steps to
save the action. Mr. Justice Douglas, on the other hand, would not
dismiss the action. He makes it clear that in his opinion the District
Court should itself, for the purpose of manageability, consider re-
stricting the case to a smaller subclass. Clearly Mr. Justice Doug-
las does not disagree with the majority view requiring some kind
of individual notice to each class member under Rule 23 (c) (2).101
specifies that one or more members of a class may sue as representative
parties on behalf of all only if "the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." And Rule 23 (c) (2) specifies
the details of the notice required in Rule 23 (b) (3) actions.
97, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 (1974).
98. Id. at 2153.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2153 n.16. To this direction to dismiss, the majority added
that the record did not reveal whether a smaller class of odd-lot traders
could be defined but that, in any event, the Court did not intimate any view
yhether any such subclass would satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.
101. Id. at 2154.
But contrary to the majority which expresses no view in this regard,
Mr. Justice Douglas makes it clear that the manner of such notice
can be arranged differently. Mr. Justice Douglas specifically men-
tions that in the Eisen case certain subclasses might be economi-
cally manageable; that, for instance, certain brokerage houses regu-
larly correspond with the members of a class participating in a so-
called "Monthly Investment Plan" or in a payroll deduction invest-
ment plan, and that the marginal cost of
. . . providing the individual notice required by Rule 23(c) (2)
might be nothing more than printing and stuffing an additional
sheet of paper in correspondence already being sent to the investor,
or perhaps only programming a computer to type an additional
paragraph at the bottom of monthly or quarterly statements regu-
larly mailed by the brokers,102
i.e. the imposition of only a minimal expense upon the defendants, a
solution which would obviously be considered constitutional by
Mr. Justice Douglas. But, nevertheless, a clarifying amendment
of Rule 23 (c) (2) would seem to be desirable.
"FLuID RECOVERY"
One of the questions raised during the eight years of litigation in
the Eisen case was the procedure by which damages would be calcu-
lated and distributed in a large class action case. Judge Tyler held
that general class damages, an aggregate of all individual damages
of class members, would be an acceptable and reliable way to cal-
culate the amount of defendants' liability. He further held that,
if liability was ultimately found, the awards would be made by a
so-called fluid class recovery, i.e., that after all individual claims
had been settled a fund would be set up to reduce the odd-lot dif-
ferential. 0 3 The court of appeals rejected the concept of fluid re-
covery as being both outside Rule 23104 and outside the Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court's Eisen opinion failed to deal with this
issue, which had been the subject of heated debate. 05
102. Id. at 2154 n.1.
103. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The odd-lot differential is the extra commission charge for dealing in less
than 100 shares of stock.
104. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973). The
court of appeals in fact went so far asto call fluid class recovery a "fantas-
tic procedure", id. at 1018.
105. See, The Case for Fluid Class Recovery, 1 CLAss ACTION REPORTER
70 (1972). But see Simon, Class Action-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruc-
tion?, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972) and Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Pro-
cedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust
Review, 71 COLum. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971), where, after discussing his belief
that individual damage claims must be proven, and noting the enormous
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As is made clear by Judge Tyler's opinion, fluid recovery is a two
stage procedure. First, the class damages are to be aggregated and
the issue of liability is to be tried once, with a single award to the
whole class. Secondly, the damages will be given to the members
of the class who notify the court of their claim, with the unclaimed
remainder going to the next best class.
For large class actions to be manageable, fluid recovery should be
allowed. Otherwise the massive number of individual damage
claims that would have to be litigated would make the case, indeed,
a "Frankenstein monster."'01 6 An example of what could happen is
the electrical equipment cases,10 7 in which 25,600 separate claims
were originally made, and six years of litigation resulted. 08 Fur-
ther, even if the large class actions could be managed by the courts,
the costs of administering the distribution of funds to individuals
directly would make such a procedure unacceptable. 10 9
The question arises whether it is possible to have aggregated
damages and a next best class recovery under Rule 23. It was ar-
gued by the court of appeals in Eisen III,110 as well as by others,"'
that allowing fluid class recovery under Rule 23 would be making
substantive law, which is prohibited by the Enabling Act under
which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated." 2
For example, it was contended that section 4 of the Clayton Act" 3
amount of time and money that would be required, the author says: "Any
device which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanage-
able and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure
-it is a form of legalized blackmail."
106. Chief Judge Lumbard, dissenting, in Eisen v. Carlise & Jacquelin,
391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968).
107. See, e.g., Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 247
F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
108. Professor Handler used this case to back up his argument that such
large suits were "blackmail". See note 105 supra, at 9.
109. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968).
See also Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions
Under Federal Rule 23(b) (3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 506 (1972).
110. 479 F.2d 1005, 1014 (1973).
111. Simon, Class Action-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction?, 55
F.R.D. 375, 383 (1972).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) which provides in part that, "[s]uch rules
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right .... "
113. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970): "Any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor in any district court ......
specifically restricts its remedy to the person who proves an "injury
in his business or his property" 114 and that fluid recovery would
cause a substantive change by allowing some who had not suffered
injury to recover. It is our belief that as long as the correlation be-
tween the damaged class and the class that recovers is proportionally
high, the argument of a "substantive change" should be considered
ill-founded. 1 5 If the correlation is great, then the intent of the
statute under which the class action is brought, presuming it is simi-
lar to 15 U.S.C. § 15, is being carried out and fluid recovery has not
caused a substantive change. However, if the correlation is low,
then fluid recovery is not acceptable as the procedure itself would
have made a substantive change from the legislative desire that
those who actually suffered the injury be given the damages.110
The reason for this conclusion is that section 4 of the Clayton Act'
1 7
with its treble damages provision was meant to be a deterrent to
certain undesirable business practices, 18 and but for allowing fluid
recovery many worthwhile class actions would become unmanage-
able. Individual recovery would be precluded by the cost of the
litigation involved as compared to the size of each individual in-
jury. 1 9 This would allow those entrepreneurs who wisely choose
to victimize large numbers of citizens, small amounts each, to retain
"the 'pot of gold' created by their illegal activities.' 20 To allow




115. See Note, The Manageability Crisis of Consumer Class Actions: The
Severe Example of Eisen III, 7 IND. L. REv. 360, 382-83 (1973).
116. See Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid Recovery Mini-Hear-
ing and Notice in Class Actions, 54 B.U.L. REV. 110, 121-22 (1974), which
suggests that all damages are awarded to those who are injured, and that
therefore fluid recovery satisfied the Clayton Act. It is only upon admin-
istration of the award, so it is contended, that others than those damaged
may benefit.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
118. See Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(i968); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
139 (1968).
119. In 1966 when the Eisen litigation was initiated, it was estimated that
the minimum cost for litigating an antitrust case would be $5,000. Alioto,
The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 93 (1966).
120. In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 287 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
121. If the statute involved is worded so as not to specifically require
damages to go to the individual harmed, then the only possible substantive
change would be the limited number of undamaged persons who are en-
riched. When balanced against the fairness to the majority of the class
which could otherwise not recover and in light of the fact that the defendant
is giving up only ill-gotten gains, the consequent unjust enrichment seems
acceptable and effects the desired substantive result, i.e., the deterrence of
such activity in the future.
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The degree of correlation between the class injured and the class
that recovers seems to have been the deciding factor in two recent
cases on the issue of whether or not to allow fluid recovery. In City
of Philadelphia v. American Oil Company,122 the district court held
that the correlation between the class of motorists who purchased
gas between 1955 and 1965 and those who would benefit by a reduc-
tion in gasoline prices in the 1970's was not sufficient to allow for a
fluid type of damage recovery. In Eisen, on the other hand, Judge
Tyler held that there was a sufficient correlation between the class
damaged and the class to benefit by a possible fluid recovery, as the
activitiy of odd-lot purchasing was thought to be sufficiently re-
petitive. 123
Another argument used by the court of appeals to back up its re-
jection of fluid recovery, was the citation of Snyder v. Harris124
for the proposition that the claims of a class cannot "be treated col-
lectively or as 'the class as a whole'."'125 But the Snyder case was
dealing with the-issue of whether for jurisdictional purposes the
claims of the class can be aggregated, and in doing so the Supreme
Court was interpreting the meaning of a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
For the purpose of allowing aggregation of damages under Rule 23
no statute, but only the Rule itself, need be interpreted, so that no
substantive change is made.126
Finally, it has been argued that one of the reasons for the Clay-
ton Act providing for treble damages is that Congress recognized
that many injured parties would not sue, and that the Act there-
122. 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D.N.J. 1971); and see Note, Federal Rule 23(b)
(3)(D): Manageability Requirement in the Treble Damage Consumer
Class Action, 31 MD. L. REV. 354 (1971).
123. 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
124. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). For a discussion of the case see text at 8,
supra.
125. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1014 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Eisen 1II).
126. See, e.g., Note, Managing the Large Class Actions: Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 87 HAnv. L. REV. 426, 450 (1973). But see Landers, Of Legal-
ized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Action and the Sub-
stance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 870 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Landers], who criticizes the Harvard Note, on the ground, inter
alia, that a court must interpret section 4 of the Clayton Act so that, as
in Snyder, the court is interpreting a statute. But even if this were cor-
rect, the court would have no reason to interpret 15 U.S.C. § 15 as ex-
cluding aggregation of class damages.
fore provided for treble damages to make the penalty sufficiently
strong so as to be an effective deterrent. Thus, it has been con-
tended that, if the class action procedure were to allow all injured
parties to collect, then the congressionally set balance would be
distorted and as a result business conduct would unintentionally be
changed and in that way a substantive change would be effected.
127
This final argument succumbs when balanced against the total
nullification of the deterrent effect of a statute, which would oc-
cur if small claims are involved and class actions were not per-
mitted.
Constitutional Problems
The court of appeals in Eisen noted that there would be a con-
stitutional violation if fluid recovery were allowed.128 The court
did not elucidate upon the nature of the supposed constitutional vi-
olation, but it could be based on the contention that the defendant
has been deprived of a lump sum without proof of individual dam-
ages. This argument seems weak. Damages may be assessed as
long as they are not
... based on speculation or guesswork. But the jury may make
a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant
data, and render its verdict accordingly. 29
Under these circumstances there is apparently no due process viola-
tion. The other constitutional argument could be that under the
fluid recovery doctrine those persons who were injured but were
not notified would be precluded from recovery; this, it would be
contended, would be a deprivation of property without due proc-
ess. 130 Such an argument was rejected in the case of State of West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.131 Furthermore, in a situation where
persons not notified 3 2 would, in any event, for statute of limita-
tions or monetary reasons be precluded from suing, the property
lost by them would seem to be de minimis.1
33
127. See Landers, supra note 126, at 868-69, for an excellent discussion
of this point.
128. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1014 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Eisen 111).
129. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946), where
the Supreme Court decided that wrongdoers must bear certain risks of un-
certainty in damage calculations. See also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
130. It should be noted that by the end of the Eisen case the statute of
limitations had run and no individual suits could have been commenced,
so that no property rights were infringed upon.
131. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
- 132. Of course all parties with substantial interests should be notified.
133. See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sniadach v. Family Fi-
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Additionally, there are a number of factors that compel usage of
fluid recovery within the framework of Rule 23. First, as will be
shown later, 34 class actions were born out of equity,13 5 and un-
der such circumstances it is proper for the court to go as far as
possible to ensure that damages be redressed and to recognize that
but for large class actions few if any of small claimants damaged
would recover. Illustrative of this same line of reasoning is the
following statement of the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on
the Civil Rules at the time of the 1966 amendment:
Yet imagination and even daring may be required of counsel and
courts in devising abbreviated but fair procedures leading to hand-
tailored relief which may well be quite novel in form.13 6
The basic problem remains whether and to what extent in con-
sidering legal claims for damages the courts should be permitted to
engage in such equitable considerations as finding ways of ensuring
compliance with statutory mandates by framing and modeling the
particular relief and, consequently, using the system of a fluid re-
covery in class actions. Such equitable considerations should be
allowed in class actions, even though the basic remedy is a legal
remedy. It should be recognized that, while the action, as such, is
at law, the distribution of the damages awarded, when in the form
of a class action, obtains an equitable character. It is not unknown
in our system that equitable considerations play a part although
the remedy involved, as such, is at law. For instance, the equi-
table device of reformation of a contract, when needed, may be used
and then damages be secured on the contract as reformed;
37
clearly, in such situations equitable considerations are used even
though the ultimate relief sought, damages, is legal. Perhaps a
more pertinent example is the practice of the U.S. Court of Claims,
nance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1968), which suggests that due process does
not attach to de minimis interests.
134. Infra note 173.
135. See CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 285 (1950) suggesting that
one of the problems of class actions is joining an equity device with money
damages.
136. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 497, 499-500
(1969). See also Judge Medina's statement in Eisen 11: "Indeed we hold
that the new Rule should be given a liberal rather than restrictive inter-
pretation." 391 F.2d at 563.
137. See the practice as followed, for instance, in Imperial Shale Brick
Co. v. Jewett, 169 N.Y. 143, 62 N.E. 167 (1901).
which by statute possesses only jurisdiction to grant legal, not
equitable, relief against the United States.138 Nevertheless, the
Court of Claims was permitted in a contract action to reform
a contract. 3 9 Also, in a taking action where the relief is only
for damages, the Court of Claims will equitably impose an ease-
ment on the land for whose taking a money judgment was
awarded.140 Similarly, in proper cases the equitable device of
"fluid recovery" should be allowed in legal actions for damages
when they are in the form of class actions. Perhaps, amendatory
language of Rule 23 should be drafted to permit such "equitable"
considerations in awarding damages in class actions.
Secondly, recovery of the unused funds by the next best class'
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would not be unique to class actions. This fluid recovery proce-
dure of giving damages to the next best class can be analogized to
the widely accepted cy pres doctrine. The cy pres doctrine is a rule
of construction whereby the courts effectuate the overriding char-
itable intent of a testamentary gift which would otherwise fail be-
cause the purpose to which the gift was directed had become impos-
sible, impractical or inexpedient. Many courts will give the gift to
a closely related charity, the next best class, thereby effectuating
the general charitable intent of the testator.142  By analogy, the
courts could effectuate the legislative intent to deter anti-social be-
havior and reimburse those who are damaged, by giving a portion
of the recovery from a class action to the next best class composed
largely of those damaged, where to do otherwise would negate the
general intent of the legislation. 143
138. United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1970).
139. United States v. Millikeii Imprinting Co., 202 U.S. 168 (1906).
140. Jensen v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 333, 305 F.2d 444 (1962); see gen-
erally 2 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL, § 1833 (2d ed. Volz 1970); D.
SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, ALl LITIGATION WITH T=E FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
§ 7.109 (ALI-ABA 1970).
141. In the case of utility or credit card refunds or any like area where
records are available, this fund would be nominal. See Ill. Bell Tel. Co.
v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1939), where all but $1,688,295 of
$18,798,980 overcharged was refunded.
142. See generally on the. cy pres doctrine E. FnscH, THE CY PRns Doc-
TRmE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950). See also Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen
539 (Mass. 1867).
143. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Supreme
Court determined that the State may not sue as parens patriae for damages
done its citizens under the Clayton Act. This would exclude the State being
the next best class. For an excellent discussion of the cy pres analogy, see
Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39
U. CHI. L. REv. 448 (1972). See also Miller, Problems in Administering Ju-
dicial Relief in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b), 54 F.R.D. 501, 510
(1972).
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Finally, even if Rule 23 cannot be read to include fluid recovery,
it has been suggested, 144 though perhaps without much justifica-
tion, that an implied remedy doctrine, such as was announced in
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,145 could appropriately be applied here. The
implied remedy doctrine holds that federal courts have the power
and duty to provide remedies in order to protect federally created
rights. The use of the doctrine has been argued to be governed by
equitable considerations, 46 and it has been urged that Rule 23,
which was born in equity, should under the Borak doctrine be
utilized for granting this kind of equitable relief in legal actions.
CONSinVIER PROTECTION LEGISLATION
In the light of Eisen IV, the question arises how to give wide-
spread relief to large classes of persons for whom individual suits
are not a legitimate alternative because of the cost of litigation.
There are two possible answers, either enactment of substantive
consumer legislation or amendments to Rule 23 and to the federal
jurisdictional statutes.
Enactment of substantive consumer legislation' 47 should take
the form of setting up a consumer protection agency (CPA). It
would be the most desirable solution if this agency were to have
standing to join consumer classes as a party in interest before the
federal courts and agencies, 4 where it could provide the exper-
tise and financial backing that would make suits such as Eisen
manageable under the present Rules. An example would be that
144. Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin, 87 H1A~v. L. REV. 426, 451 (1973). But see Landers, supra note 126, at
872.
145. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
146. See Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 87 HARv. L. REv. 426, 452 (1973).
147. Our discussion of consumer legislation will be restricted to possible
steps that Congress could take to enable Eisen type suits to be manageable.
148. If a bill such as the Class Action Jurisdiction Act, S. 1980, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1969), were passed, all consumer class actions could be brought
in federal courts regardless of the amount in controversy or diversity of citi-
zenship. This would increase the importance of the proposed intervention
power of the CPA, as cases which now could only be brought in state courts
could then be brought in federal court. For an interesting note on the pro-
posed Class Action Jurisdiction Act, see 69 McH. L. REV. 710 (1971); see
also proposed amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), text accompanying
notes 158 et seq., infra.
while an individual class representative might not be able to afford
the necessary costs of notice, the CPA could provide such funds.140
The expenses of the Government could be reimbursed from the
award with the remainder going to a "fluid type" of recovery, and
in this form, preferably in a context more manageable than the ac-
tual Eisen facts, a situation broadly similar to the Eisen situation
could be handled properly.150 At this writing, many bills have
been introduced in Congress proposing the setting up of a CPA
which would have varying responsibilities. The House of Repre-
sentatives has passed 51 H.R. 13167, 93d Cong., which would set up
a CPA to represent consumer' 52 interests. The new agency would
have the restricted right to request federal agencies to subpoena in-
formation and to participate in the hearings of federal agencies or
in federal court proceedings. 53 If the Bill should be enacted into
law it would not provide relief in the Eisen type situation, as the
Bill does not provide for financial assistance by the CPA. 54
The Senate is currently considering various proposals for a CPA,
the strongest being S. 707. S. 707 specifically states as a "Finding"
that consumers each year suffer economic harm in the course of
using goods and services. Its definition of "consumer" (section 4
(7)) is so broad as to include the acquisition of services and of tan-
gible or intangible property for personal services, and "interest of
consumer" (section 4(11)) includes any economic concern of con-
sumers involving tangible or intangible goods, or services, which
may become the subject of any transaction. Despite these broad
definitions, the CPA would not be able to obtain court relief for
the individual consumer in the Eisen-type situation. However, a
very desirable and appropriate result which would generally rem-
edy the situation in the future for the class as a whole might be
149. It might also be possible to solve the problem of "adequate represen-
tation" by means of the CPA.
150. See the discussion of our preference for a more manageable situation
than the Eisen facts presented, text accompanying notes 106-09, supra.
151. Passed on April 3, 1974, by a vote of 293 to 94. See CoNG. Q., April
6, 1974, Vol. 32, No. 14, at 899.
152. The term "consumer" is given a relatively narrow definition in this
Bill: "The term 'consumer' means any person who uses for personal, family
or household purposes goods and services offered or furnished for a consid-
eration." H.R. 13167, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 15 (1974).
153. Under H.R. 13167, the CPA may only ask for a subpoena from an-
other federal agency in order to protect consumer interest. The federal
agency will issue the subpoena only if the information substantially affects
consumer interest, the information is relevant, and the subpoena is not bur-
densome to that agency or the person subpoenaed. See H.R. 13167, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (a) (1) (1974).
154. For a more complete discussion of the provisions of H.R. 13167, see
CoqG. Q., April 6, 1974, Vol. 32, No. 14, at 899.
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accomplished by the broad authority of the CPA to intervene on be-
half of consumers in any formal or informal proceedings of admin-
istrative agencies and to seek review and to enjoin the illegal prac-
tice. Although it is true that the notice requirements of Rule 23 (c)
(2) apply only in a Rule 23(b) (3) situation-and therefore are in-
applicable when merely an injunction is sought under Rule 23(b)
(2) '-in practice, the individual consumer in an Eisen-type situa-
tion probably could not even be expected to have, or expend, funds
sufficient for obtaining the costly injunctive relief. To that ex-
tent, S. 707 could serve a valuable purpose.156
Most recently, Senator Mondale has proposed an amendment to
S. 707 which would allow the CPA to give
information and financial assistance to private organizations of con-
sumers representing a substantial number of individuals for the
purpose of assisting such organizations in intervening or participat-
ing in any agency or judicial proceedings which substantially af-
fect consumer interests.1
57
This might allow continuation of cases such as Eisen, at least in a




As indicated previously, 55 the Snyder and Zahn cases have se-
riously limited the effectiveness of Rule 23(b) (3) class actions in
the federal system by requiring, absent specific statutory language,
that the leader of the class and each member of the class individ-
ually meet the $10,000 requirement. In view of the fact that the
Snyder and Zahn cases based their conclusions largely upon juris-
dictional grounds' 59 and specifically mentioned the principle of
Rule 82 that the rules shall not be construed to extend the juris-
diction of the district courts, it would seem proper that the remedy
be provided by an Act of Congress.
155. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 n.14 (1974).
156. For a more complete discussion of the provisions of S. 707, see CONG.
Q., March 31, 1973, Vol. 31, No. 13, at 719.
157. See S. 707, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), proposed amendment No. 1521
of § 17 (June 24, 1974).
158. See text accompanying notes 43 et seq., supra.
159. Id.
The enactment of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970 may
furnish a valuable example in this regard. In 1970 Ohio promul-
gated new Rules of Civil Procedure which were largely modeled
after the Federal Rules. On the subject of class actions Ohio
pretty much copied 60 Federal Rule 23 as amended in 1966, but Ohio
Civil Rule 23 added a subdivision (F) reading as follows: "The
claims of the class shall be aggregated in determining the jurisdic-
tion of the court." That provision was added in order to convey
jurisdiction of class actions more generally upon the Ohio Common
Pleas Courts, rather than entrusting them largely to the Ohio Mu-
nicipal Courts.161 A similar statute may be added to 28 U.S.C. ch.
85, regulating the jurisdiction of the United States district courts.
Section 1331 and section 1332 generally establish the $10,000 mini-
mum requirement for federal question and diversity cases, respec-
tively. To the extent that the jurisdiction of a class action is gen-
erally based only on those provisions, the following provisions
might be added:
In determining the original jurisdiction of the district courts un-
der sections 1331 and 1332. of this title the claims of the members
of a class proceeding under Rule 23(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, shall be aggregated for the purpose of ascertaining the
amount in controversy.
160. It should be noted that prior to 1970, Ohio had only the general pro-
vision of former OHIO REvIsED CODE § 2307.21 according to which, when a
question was one of common or general interest of many persons, or the
parties were very numerous and it was impracticable to bring them all be-
fore the court, there could be a suit or defense by one for the benefit of
all. In other words, the Ohio Code provision was even much less specific
than old Federal Rule 23 before its amendment in 1966. See 1 JACOBY, OMo
Cnrm PRACTICE UNDER THE RuLEs 207 (Banks-Baldwin 1970).
161. The monetary jurisdiction of the Ohio Municipal Courts throughout
the state is generally limited to claims not exceeding $5,000, in certain coun-
ties to claims not exceeding $7,500 or $10,000. Omo REVIsED CODE § 1901.17.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the notice
requirements under Federal Rule 23 (c) has important consequences in state
class actions as well. For example, both Ohio and Kentucky have class ac-
tion rules that substantially copy Federal Rule 23, and it would now seem
possible that the notice requirements under these state rules would be in-
terpreted to be the same as under the Federal Rule. See 1 JACOBY, Owo
CIVIL PRACTICE UNDER THE RuLEs 205 (Banks-Baldwin 1970); 1 RusSEL'S
KENTucKy PRACTICE: AND FoRms 62 (Banks-Baldwin, 1971). Further, in
California, the statute under which class actions are brought, CAL. CIv. PRo.
CoD § 382 (West 1973), has been given a broad interpretation, resulting in
some provisions being interpreted much like Federal Rule 23. The effect of
Eisen IV may possibly be as great as in those states which copy the Federal
Rules verbatim. See, Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732,
63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). Finally, in certain states, such as New York,
Eisen IV's notice requirements, unless they are held also to be constitutional
requirements, would probably not have a great impact, as its statutory in-
terpretation has been more limited. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1005 (McKinney
1963). See also Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class
Actions, 9 BUFFALo L. REv. 433 (1960).
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Amendment of Federal Rule 23
This article's discussion of Eisen IV has demonstrated the desir-
ability of certain amendments in order to make class actions under
Rule 23(b) (3) more readily available. An attempt was made to
demonstrate that probably no constitutional objections prohibit
such amendments, except that perhaps some notice to each member
of the class is constitutionally required; clearly, regulation as to
who should bear the costs of such notices is not constitutionally
limited.
First, it should be clarified that there is broad power in the dis-
trict courts on their own motion to reduce a class action to a smaller
subclass, even if only for the purpose of reducing the cost of any
notice. As discussed earlier, it was apparently on this basis that
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented from the mandate in Eisen IV.162 In
his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas finds authority in Rule 23 (c) (1) for
the reduction of a class action to subclasses, and he calls this con-
clusion "as plain as words can make it.'103 Nevertheless, clarifying
language may be desirable, specifying that such determination may
be on the court's own motion. Language concerning appealability
may also be desirable.
The amendatory language adding a third and fourth sentence to
Rule 23 (c) (1) may read as follows:
Such determintion may be made upon the motion of either party
or upon the court's own motion. In addition to other orders, such
determination may be one of reducing the size of the class to a
smaller subclass, and the determination may have the express pur-
pose of decreasing the expense of giving the required notice to the
members of the class under Federal Rule 23(c) (2). When sub-
stantially reducing the size of a class, such order shall be zonsid-
ered a final order.
Next, the question arises as to the desirability of qualifying the
manner of the notice required under Rule 23 (c) (2). In his dissent
in Eisen IV, Mr. Justice Douglas specifically suggested a solution
162. See text accompanying notes 98 et seq., supra.
163. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2155 (1974). Rule
23 (c) (1) reads as follows:
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdi-
vision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before
the decision on the merits. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (1).
whereby in a smaller subclass action notice may be effected by
the defendant brokerage houses which would have regular contact
with the individual members of the subclass during their course
of business.164 Such a solution clearly seems constitutionally per-
missible and proper in light of the text of the Rule, the "practicali-
ties" of Mullane, and de minimis considerations. 105 For the pur-
pose of clarifying the present situation, the following language may
be inserted after the first sentence of Rule 23 (c) (2) :166
Notice shall normally be provided by the party suing on behalf of
the class unless the court, on the basis of evidence, finds that the
other party can supply the notice with relatively minimal expense,
in which event the court shall order that other party to do so.
The proposed amendments of Rule 23 discussed thus far, are
largely of a clarifying nature. Next, we will suggest amendments
which are of a more fundamental, policy-making character. These
suggestions deal with three large questions: (1) whether there
might be a qualification of the individual notice requirement of
Rule 23(c) (2); (2) whether there might be a minihearing, possibly
imposing certain notice costs on the defendant and, if so, when and
under what circumstances; and (3) whether the court might have
the power generally to provide for a system of "fluid recovery" in
a proper case.
With regard to the second question, it was suggested earlier
there are no constitutional objections to imposing costs of notice
upon defendant, although certain limitations as to the mechanics
seem desirable. As a matter of sound policy, the imposition upon
the defendant of some reasonable costs of the notice seems wise,
especially in consumer class actions where the expected recovery
by the individual may be minute and where, without such imposi-
tion, class actions may not be economically possible. But care
should be taken to assure that the costs do not become an exces-
sive burden for the defendant.
It was also suggested earlier that a sentence be added after the
first sentence of Rule 23 (c) (2), to the effect that minimal costs of
notice may be imposed upon defendant even without a hearing.
Here costs would be more than minimal. Mr. Justice Powell's opin-
ion held that the use of such a procedure in the Eisen case "contra-
164. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2154 n.1 (1974).
165. See text accompanying note 133, supra.
166. The first sentence of Rule 23 (c) (2) reads as follows:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
FsD. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2).
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venes the Rule"167 but it would seem possible to amend Rule 23.
What is suggested is that in particular circumstances the court de-
termination whether an action should be a class action be post-
poned, that certain conditions for holding a preliminary hearing
be established, and, finally, that conditions be laid down for impos-
ing the costs on the defendant. Support for the latter suggestion
may be found in the general equity powers. In the field of injunc-
tions, Rule 65 (c) specifically provides that the court require secu-
rity from the'applicant ".... for the payment of such costs and dam-
ages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained." Nevertheless, there
are quite a few cases brought by indigents or cases instituted as
public interest litigation where no security, or only a nominal
amount, was required.
For instance, a preliminary injunction to restrain cut-backs in
benefits under New York's Medicaid Program was granted without
requiring the applicant to post a bond under Rule 65(c).168 Simi-
larly, in big environmental cases only nominal security has been
required. While the potential injury a company may suffer each
day that a pipeline or power plant is prevented from operating
may be extensive, courts have permitted injunction suits to con-
tinue though only "inadequate" security is posted; in suits by
classes of individual neighbors, it was felt that no plaintiff or group
of plaintiffs had sufficient resources to post an adequate bond.
Thus, in an injunction suit against the Government 69 in which the
Government asked for a $750,000 bond for the first month and
$2,500,000 for each month thereafter, the court instead imposed a
nominal bond of $100, stating that:
[T]he requirement of more than a nominal amount as security
would in the Court's opinion stifle the intent of the [1969 National
Environmental Policy] Act, since these three 'concerned private
organizations' [three nonprofit environmental organizations] would
be precluded from obtaining judicial review of the defendant's ac-
tion. 170
167. 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 (1974).
168. Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
169. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167
(D.D.C. 1971), affd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See
also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1385 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
170. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167,
169 (D.D.C. 1971).
In another substantial environmental injunction case, the court
simply required security "equivalent to One ($1.00) Dollar."'1 '
Similarly, with respect to discovery, another device of equitable ori-
gin, a court has ordered prepayment of counsel fees and expenses
by the non-moving -party in a proper case.172
Like the institutions of injunctions and discovery, the device of
class actions has its source in equity, and is described as an "inven-
tion of equity."'173 Therefore, in a proper case, a court handling a
class action should have the preliminary authority to impose costs
on the defendant. A defendant enjoined without obtaining any
security, or only a nominal security, may suffer substantial loss be-
cause he is enjoined, perhaps improperly, from operating his busi-
ness. But this loss by a possibly innocent defendant is justified in
so-called public interest litigation by general equity principles. In
the same way, in the device of class actions, especially those of con-
sumer litigation, equitable principles appear to justify the court in
imposing on defendant costs which occur in the handling of class ac-
tions, as long as care is taken that such costs remain reasonable.
This suggestion has nothing to do with the exceptional situations,
like shareholder derivative actions, where a fiduciary duty pre-ex-
ists between plaintiff shareholder and defendant corporation and
where, consequently, the defendant corporation may be ordered to
advance costs. 74 Application of that exceptional rule to the Eisen
situation was specifically brushed aside by the Supreme Court in
Eisen IV on the ground that, different from the situation of a pre-
existing fiduciary duty in stockholders derivative actions, the rela-
tionship between the parties in Eisen is "truly adversarial."'75 But
the relationships between the parties in the public interest field of
environmental injunction litigation, of course, are also "truly ad-
versarial."
Accordingly, the following amendatory sentence may be sug-
gested at the end of Rule 23 (c) (2):
171. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng. of U.S. Army, 331 F.
Supp. 925, 927 (D.D.C. 1971).
172. River Plate Corp. v. Forestal Land, Timber & Ry. Co., 185 F. Supp.
832, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Note, Managing the Large Class Ac-
tion: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426, 445 (1973).
173. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940):
The class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed
to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the
subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in
conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable.
174. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498-500 (E.D.N.Y.
1968).
175. 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2153 (1974).
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In cases where the expense of the notice appears to exceed nomi-
nal amounts, the court on the basis of equitable principles may in
a proper case impose the costs in whole or in part on defendant,
but only after a preliminary hearing in which the court has found
(1) that even after reduction of the class action to that of a sub-
class the notice expenses still exceed bearable amounts, (2) that
as a matter of law the complaint will survive motions by the de-
fendant either to dismiss or for summary judgment, and (3) that,
on the basis of evidence, recovery by the members of the class is
more than likely.
Also, the following sentence may be added to Rule 23 (c) (1):
Such determination shall be postponed until after the court has
completed any preliminary hearing it may hold in accordance with
the fourth sentence of subsection (c) (2) of this Rule.
The first question postulated170 was whether the "individual no-
tice" requirement of Rule 23(c) (2) should be qualified by amend-
ment. As explained earlier,177 the dismissal of the class action by
Eisen IV was based upon an interpretation of Rule 23(c) (2) but ap-
parently not directly upon constitutional principles of due process.
However, caution should be exercised in view of the fact that the
Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendments of Rule 23 spe-
cifically referred to the Mulane case when it described Rule 23(c)
(2) as being "designed to fulfill requirements of due process to
which the class action procedure is of course subject."'1' 5 Any
qualification to permit service by publication only should be
avoided, especially when it is realized that the Mullane Court
found service by publication unconstitutional even in the in rem or
quasi in rem action involved in Mullane, whereas the typical Rule
23(b) (3) class action is an in personam action where service by
publication is even more suspect. Still, certain qualifications of the
"individual notice" requirement of Rule 23(c) (2) seem desirable,
such as permitting notification to the members of the class di-
rectly or indirectly, or to the leaders of a group, who can be ex-
pected to forward the notification to the members of the group.
Such qualifications are not as questionable as service by publica-
tion, but they should 'be understood to modify Eisen IV's strict in-
terpretation of Rule 23(c) (2). Accordingly, the concluding portion
176. See text at 31, supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 56 et seq., supra.
178. 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
of the first sentence of Rule 23(c) (2) should be amended to read
as follows:
... including notice to the members who can be identified through
reasonable effort, either notice individually to each member of the
class, or in a proper case notice to a leader of a group, who can
be expected to forward the notification to each member of the
group, or by other direct or indirect notice.
Finally, an amendment to Rule 23 (c) (1) might be suggested spec-
ifying that in a proper case the court may determine that the re-
covery in a class action shall be by the device of "fluid recov-
ery."179  Care should be taken to assure that the device be em-
ployed only in cases where in the court's opinion recovery by means
of a class action is the only method by which the legislative pur-
pose of the law under which the damages are awarded, can properly
be effectuated, and where the correlation between the class ac-
tually damaged and the persons likely to receive damages under
the "fluid recovery" doctrine is extremely high.
It has previously been shown that the equitable mechanism of a
fluid recovery seems proper in class actions. Accordingly, it is sug-
gested that the following concluding sentence be added to Rule 23
(c) (1):
After a hearing the court may determine that the recovery in a
class action under subdivision (b) (3) be by means of a so-called
fluid recovery, i.e., that (1), without proof of the extent of the dam-
ages suffered by each individual member of the class, there be a
single ruling as to the total amount of damages due from the de-
fendant to the class as a whole, that (2), then, the individual mem-
bers of the groups by proper notification and proof to the court of
their damages obtain recovery, and (3) that any remaining funds
of the recovery, finally, be awarded to the class of persons closest
in character to the class originally described; but such a determin-
ation can be made by the court only if the correlation between the
class as originally described and the class which can ultimately be
expected to recover pursuant to notification is extremely high and
if the court finds that the legislative purpose of the law under
which damages are awarded in the action can only be effectuated
properly by means of a class action.
CONCLUSION
This article was written for the purpose of revitalizing Rule 23
(b) (3) class actions following the rulings of Snyder, Zahn and es-
pecially Eisen IV. These three Supreme Court opinions were ana-
lyzed carefully in order to determine whether such effort is possi-
ble without any constitutional amendment. The principal innova-
tion of the "spurious" class action in 1966 was the rule that, while
179. See text accompanying notes 103 et seq., supra for the discussion of
"fluid recovery".
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formerly class members had to take affirmative steps to partici-
pate in the class, now they are bound by the class action unless they
opt out. 80 In the authors' view, this 1966 change of policy was
sound especially in the fields of consumer, environmental, and mass
tort litigation, and it should be preserved.' 8 ' Without it some of
that litigation would be most difficult to handle.
8 2
What are the statutory and rule changes necessary to accomplish
the purpose? First, the limiting results of Snyder and Zahn seem
to require statutory amendment. Many matters implicit in Eisen
IV, however, could be remedied by amendments to Rule 23. In or-
der to avoid certain restrictive interpretations of Eisen IV, several
clarifying amendments were suggested, namely (a) the addition of
a third sentence to Rule 23(c) (1) and (b) the insertion of a sec-
ond sentence into Rule 23(c) (2). These two amendments would
not solve all of the basic problems of class actions but they would
assist future courts in following Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting
opinion.
Some of these basic problems are whether a mini-hearing can be
held to impose costs of the required notice on the defendant,
whether the requirement of individual notice should be qualified
somewhat, and whether there should be a fluid recovery in cer-
tain class actions. To remedy these problem areas, amendments to
Rule 23 (c) (2) and Rule 23 (c) (1) were suggested which would,
among other things, establish a procedure for imposing substantial
costs on the defendant and which would qualify the notice require-
ment. By these amendments, it is hoped, some larger class actions
would be made more feasible. But it should be understood that even
these amendments would not make it possible to entertain a class
action of the size intended by Eisen. The imposition of costs on the
defendant is intended to remain within reasonable limits, and the
180. See also 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02[1] (2d ed. 1974):
"As to the old, the call of the barn dance would be: the doe hop in; and as
to the mod, the doe hop out."
181. See the quotation of Mr. Justice Douglas' remarks in Eisen IV, 94
S. Ct. 2140, 2156 (1974) with which this article began.
182. It should be noted that the limiting effect of the Supreme Court rul-
ings may not be as severely felt in the environmental field as in consumer
litigation because in the environmental field injunctive relief very fre-
quently is the appropriate relief, and we are here not concerned with that
type of action; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2).
notice solution would not permit service by publication; conse-
quently, the Eisen suit could not be handled even if the amend-
ments were adopted. Moreover, relief of the type and extent under
the Eisen facts is, in any event, not appropriate for private class ac-
tions. Rather, activities of the kind suggested for the proposed Con-
sumer Protection Agency may be more appropriate.
It is the authors' view that Eisen should have been dismissed as
unmanageable under Rule 23(b) (3) (D). If in Eisen 11183 the dis-
senting opinion 8 4 of Chief Judge Lumbard had prevailed, the Eisen
case would have reached the Supreme Court on the basis of a dis-
trict court's dismissal on the ground of unmanageability, and per-
haps some of the problems of class actions here discussed would
have been presented to the Supreme Court in subsequent cases in a
more favorable light. The imposition of costs on the defendant and
the problem of a mini-hearing might have encountered a more sym-
pathetic reaction. It is the authors' hope that these proposed
amendments will assist in salvaging proper class actions. While
adoption of all the proposed amendments to Rule 23 is the ultimate
goal, it is suggested that at least the two clarifying amendments to
Rule 23, first considered in our discussion of the proposed amend-
ments, 8 5 be considered expeditiously.
183. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
184. Id. at 570-72.
185. See text accompanying notes 162 et seq., supra.
